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EXPLANATIONS OF POLITICAL EURO-
SCEPTICISM AT THE INDIVIDUAL,
REGIONAL AND NATIONAL LEVELS
Marcel Lubbers
Department of Sociology, Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
Peer Scheepers
Professor of Methods in Social Sciences, Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT: This article investigates to what extent nationalist and anti-out-
group drives contribute to the explanation of political euro-scepticism, in
addition to economic and political drives. The authors disentangle individual-
level, regional-level and country-level effects by using the European Social
Survey, covering 21 European countries (n34,160), which is enriched with
region and country characteristics. Perceived threat from immigrants as well
as political distrust increase political euro-scepticism, explaining low levels
of euro-scepticism among higher educated people, higher income categories
and socio-cultural specialists. At the contextual level, the authors find that
scepticism increases with the distance to Brussels. Moreover, it is found
that in countries where television broadcasts are dubbed, euro-scepticism is
lower than in countries using subtitles. The authors find small effects from
intra-EU trade and number of foreign tourists. In particular, differences
between countries in political euro-scepticism are explained by duration of
EU membership.
Key words: euro-scepticism; ethnic competition; multilevel analysis; regions
1. Introduction
The reduction of sovereignty of the nation-state to decide on certain
policy domains is one of the central elements of the recent European
Constitution. However, there is widespread resistance to such a reduction
of national sovereignty, an issue that has seldom been the focus of previous
studies, with the exception of, for example, Dalton and Eichenberg (1998),
De Winter and Swyngedouw (1999) and Hooghe (2003). Recently, Vo¨ssing
(2005) showed the relevance of nationality for political euro-scepticism












































than at the European Union (EU) level, in the period 1990/1994).1
Luedtke (2005) stressed the importance of national identity in decisions
over immigration policies. Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) provided
evidence that political euro-scepticism is distinct empirically from
instrumental euro-scepticism (i.e., considering the EU to be a bad thing
for the national country). Moreover, political euro-scepticism turns out to
be far more widespread than instrumental euro-scepticism, which has
already been widely researched (Anderson 1998; Anderson and Reichert
1996; Deflem and Pampel 1996; Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Hooghe and
Marks 2005, Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Mahler et al . 2000; Marsh 1999).
Given this state of the art, we will focus on the macro- and micro-level
explanations of political euro-scepticism, building on studies by Dı´ez
Medrano (2003) and Gabel (1998a), borrowing explanations for instru-
mental euro-scepticism. Most prior research focused merely on economic
and political theories. We will add rival theories and hypotheses on
nationalism as proposed by Duchesne and Frognier (1995), De Master and
Le Roy (2000), McLaren (2001), Dı´ez Medrano (2003), Luedtke (2005)
and Hooghe and Marks (2005). By elaborating upon these rival or
complementary theories, and by deriving contradictory or complementary
hypotheses, we will be able to test these hypotheses more systematically
and more rigorously than have earlier studies. The overview of previous
research provides a somewhat fragmented picture of macro-level explana-
tions, which we will re-organise and test systematically for political euro-
scepticism. We will perform our research not only at the individual and
country levels, as is done by most research, but we will also theorise about
and test regional-level effects of euro-scepticism, as has been proposed by
Mahler et al . (2000) and Dı´ez Medrano (2003). By using multilevel
techniques (Snijders & Bosker 1999), we think we can raise the research to
a higher level. With the emphasis on macro-level explanations based on
nationalist drives, we test for the first time to what extent macro-level
variation in euro-scepticism is associated with nationalist cultural expres-
sions. Our research question then reads: To what extent is political
euro-scepticism explained at the individual-, regional- and country levels?
More specifically, we will answer the question of what extent nationalist
characteristics drive political euro-scepticism, in addition to political and
economic characteristics.
1. Comparable to previous research on euro-scepticism, we use the term ‘euro-
scepticism’ as an attitude towards the EU. Mudde proposed to disentangle ‘euro-
scepticism’ and ‘EU-scepticism’. However, the term ‘euro-scepticism’ is so broadly






































2. Theories on euro-scepticism
Turning to theories on euro-scepticism, we propose following Gabel
(1998a) by making a distinction between utilitarian, or economic,
explanations and political explanations. Where the former emphasise the
outcome of a cost-benefit evaluation to be crucial for people’s attitude
towards the EU, the latter emphasises the importance of political interest,
knowledge and trust. Here we add the importance of the nation-state, as
proposed by Duchesne and Frognier (1995), De Master and Le Roy
(2000), Carey (2002), Christin and Trechsel (2002) and Hooghe and Marks
(2005), referring to nationalist motivations driving euro-scepticism. These
three perspectives will be elaborated at the individual and contextual
(regional and national) levels.
2.1. Nationalist and anti-out-group drives of political euro-
scepticism: Individual level
The body of literature about nationalist sentiments related to ‘keeping the
EU out’ is growing. De Master and Le Roy (2000: 419) were among the
first to emphasise the attention to motivations of euro-scepticism related
to ‘preservations of national integrity or fear of foreign influences’. They
claim that foreigners could be regarded as different from the national in-
group and hence perceived to threaten the integrity of a nation (this point
has been emphasised by De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005) as well). This
idea may be substantiated theoretically by (derivations from) social
identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Tajfel 1981; Brown 1995).
This theory proposes that individuals have the fundamental need to
perceive their in-group as superior to many out-groups (i.e., in-group
bias). Subsequently, they apply favourable characteristics to themselves
they perceive among members of the in-group via a mental process labeled
‘social identification’, and they value out-groups negatively via mecha-
nisms of ‘social contra-identification’ (e.g., Adorno et al . 1982 [1950];
Levine and Campbell 1972; Brewer 1986; Coenders et al . 2004). Hence, to
the extent that we may assume that in-group bias translates into
attributing high value to (national) traditions, we may infer that these
national sentiments drive resistance to policies directed toward ‘integrated
nation-states’, which consequently may be considered to be at the expense
of national sovereignty (De Master and Le Roy 2000: 425) (i.e., political
euro-scepticism).
Similarly, immigration and the presence of foreigners, legitimised by
EU regulations (Schengen), may be considered a threat to national
traditions, irrespective of whether the foreigners are from within the EU
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or not (Sniderman et al . 2000), in turn inducing political euro-scepticism.
De Master and Le Roy showed the relationship between xenophobia and
instrumental euro-scepticism, however, only with bivariate analyses. They
urged researchers to test the relation using multivariate analysis. Hooghe
and Marks (2005) have done so fruitfully with respect to attitudes on
European integration, while Luedtke (2005) has used it for explaining
support for immigration policies and De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2005)
for voting in referenda about the EU. Following this research, we set out to
test to what extent it holds true that people who attach high value to
(national) traditions or who are opposed to immigrants from European
countries or who perceive a threat from immigrants in general support
political euro-scepticism more strongly.
Coenders et al . (2004) have shown that nationalist attitudes are
particularly widespread among low-educated people, working-class people
and people with lower incomes. Previous research (Quillian 1995;
Kunovich 2004) has, moreover, extensively shown that anti-out-group
attitudes are strongly prevalent particularly among the lower strata / that
is, those who have to compete with immigrants (or fear they have to) over
scarce resources within similar social strata (Kiehl and Werner 1999). On
the assumption that nationalist and anti-out-group attitudes drive political
euro-scepticism, we hypothesise that euro-scepticism strongly prevails
among people with lower education, manual workers and people with a
low income, as they attach more value to national traditions, are more
strongly opposed to immigrants from European countries and perceive a
stronger threat from immigrants. Moreover, religious people, elderly
people and people living in the countryside were found to be more
nationalistic (Coenders et al . 2004). These categories of people adhere to
local or national traditions and consistently resist cosmopolitan spheres,
possibly inducing political euro-scepticism. We expect therefore that
religious people, elderly people and people living in the countryside will
subscribe strongly to political euro-scepticism as well as they are more
likely to attach importance to (local or national) traditions.
2.2. Nationalist drives of euro-scepticism: Region and country levels
Previous studies have not taken into account characteristics at the regional
or national level referring to nationalism to explain variations in euro-
scepticism, as has been done for economic and political characteristics.
Following social identity theory (Tajfel 1981), we expect that in countries
where people emphasise their national identity more strongly, there is
stronger opposition to the EU. We expect that in countries where people






































to international expressions, national identity is stronger and hence people
are more inclined to political euro-scepticism. Similarly, we assume that
national (non-religious) celebrations (e.g., mostly being independence
days, remembrance days or royal celebration days) strengthen the national
identity and hence increase political euro-scepticism.
At the regional level, we suggest that nationalism or regionalism are
expressed either by the region’s relation to Brussels or to that of the
nation-state. Die´z Medrano (2003) has shown that regions that are further
away from Brussels are more likely to be indifferent to what happens
there. Hence, we expect that geographical distance might induce political
euro-scepticism. Even though for many people distances are easier to
bridge both due to the information society and cheap international flights,
the saliency of what happens more nearby will be higher than what
happens far away. Moreover, some regions have troubled relations with the
nation-state to which they belong. Some of those regions have some
autonomy, while others are striving for independence. In these regions,
people are less likely to support the national state and are expected to be
less politically euro-sceptic.
Building on ethnic competition theory (Olzak 1992; Quillian 1995),
previous studies have revealed relationships between the presence of out-
groups, enforcing processes of contra-identification, inducing exclusio-
nism (Scheepers et al . 2002) or extreme right-wing voting behaviour
(Lubbers et al . 2002). Consequently, we expect that higher numbers of
foreigners produce stronger social contra-identification and a consistently
stronger political euro-scepticism.
2.3. Economic drives of euro-scepticism: Individual level
According to Gabel (1998a), the utilitarian approach has been most
successful in explaining whether people believe that EU membership is
good or bad. People experience different costs and benefits from
membership and are therefore expected to differ in their attitudes toward
the EU (Gabel and Palmer 1995). The general proposition is that in
circumstances in which people are expected to gain more / in economic
terms / from the EU, they subscribe less to political euro-scepticism.
Higher educated and higher occupational categories have been assumed
to profit more from free movement of people and goods (Ultee 1989);
Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) posited this as the ‘human capital
hypothesis’. As these privileged categories have better opportunities for
applying their talents in an international setting than lower educated
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people, they are expected to be more benevolent toward European
integration (Gabel and Palmer 1995) and are expected to subscribe less
to political euro-scepticism. Similarly, internationalisation would be
profitable for higher income groups as they can ‘exploit the greater
investment opportunities provided by the more open financial markets’
(Frieden 1991; see Gabel 1998a: 337). Conversely, this ‘capitalist
hypothesis’ (Gabel and Palmer 1995) predicts that lower income groups
adhere more strongly to political euro-scepticism. We would like to add
that we expect that, in particular, socio-cultural specialists (mostly people
working in the public sector like teachers and social scientists) demon-
strate less political euro-scepticism as internationalisation is unlikely to
harm their positions, while Europe creates opportunities for them as
explained by the human capital hypothesis.
2.4. Economic drives of euro-scepticism: Region and country levels
Some of the European countries are net contributors, while others profit
strongly. As a result of the Structural Funds, differences in the extent that
nations profit from EU membership exist not only between countries, but
between regions as well. Consequently, we expect net-contributing
countries as well as regions with smaller funds gained from the EU, to
subscribe more strongly to political euro-scepticism. This relation has
been corroborated empirically by Marsh (1999), Mahler et al . (2000) and
Gabel and Palmer (1995), whereas Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) found no
effect. With regard to political euro-scepticism, De Winter and Swynge-
douw (1999) found hardly any effect from EU budgetary returns.
Other conditions under which gains from the EU are larger are the
percentage of total trade with the EU and a positive trade balance
(‘mercantilist hypothesis’: Gabel and Palmer 1995) as well as under a low
inflation rate (Mahler et al . 2000). Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) claim
that, among other characteristics, inflation taps economic hardship,
contrasting with the EU’s promise on increased prosperity Europe-
wide. The EU would be blamed in times of recession (Marsh 1999).
Comparing inflation rates between EU countries should inform us
whether rising prices explain why people are more likely to favour
political euro-scepticism in some countries. Finally, we expect that regions
profiting more strongly from European tourists will be more likely to







































2.5. Political drives of euro-scepticism: Individual level
The general proposition following from political science tradition is that
people who are less politically informed will subscribe more strongly to
euro-scepticism. This ‘cognitive mobilisation’ explanation is derived from
Inglehart’s idea that well-developed skills are needed to understand what
the EU is about (Inglehart 1970). Moreover, any knowledge (message-
independent) would increase support for European integration (Gabel
1998a). Following this notion, we would expect the higher educated to be
less politically euro-sceptical as they are expected to be more interested in
politics. The same proposition applies to differences in euro-scepticism
between men and women and between age groups as previous studies have
shown that men and the elderly are more interested in politics (Gabel
1998a).
As the EU is described by some as an elite project that ordinary people
know little about, it is expected that people adopt the views on European
integration that the political parties actually take (Gabel 1998a). All
governments in this study supported EU enlargement in 2002/2003. An
individual’s positive evaluation of the national government and the
economic performance of the country, then, should go hand-in-hand
with lower levels of euro-scepticism, as has previously been shown by
Anderson (1998). Anderson argued that the effect of government
dissatisfaction should controlled for the effect of political distrust in
general: People, who are in general distrustful, are expected to subscribe
strongly to political euro-scepticism, or even more strongly because of the
‘longstanding debate centering around the democratic deficit of the EU’
(Anderson 1998: 576).
2.6. Political drives of euro-scepticism: Region and country levels
At the contextual level, we follow previous research proposing that EU
membership duration has induced more knowledge of the EU and has
thus decreased political euro-scepticism (Anderson and Reichart 1996; De
Winter and Swyngedouw 1999; Marsh 1999). Again, some countries may
gain more from membership than others, according to the security
principle, as the argument of ‘No more war in Europe ever again’ has been
central to further European cooperation. De Winter and Swyngedouw
(1999) proposed to test the effect of the population size of the country,
assuming that small countries would perceive stronger threat from large
countries and therefore would be less inclined to political euro-scepticism.
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Both Gabel and Palmer (1995) and Dı´ez Medrano (2003) translated the
security principle into the percentage of deaths during the Second World
War. They showed that more deaths in a country increased approval of
further European integration. We will test if this holds also for political
euro-scepticism. Moreover, we will include more countries than before /
particularly Poland, where the suffering was particularly hard. Finally,
building on the security principle, we expect that regions at the outer EU
borders, as compared to regions at intra-EU borders, experience larger
threats from foreign non-EU powers and are therefore less inclined to
political euro-scepticism. Previously, Die´z Medrano (2003) and Gabel and
Anderson (2002) took this explanation of intra-EU borders into account,
though they interpreted it as larger familiarity and more inter-regional
funding, respectively.
Recently, Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) have shown that methodolo-
gical artefacts (like the percentages of missing values) contribute to
explanations of political euro-scepticism, though without including other
contextual explanations. In this contribution we propose to account for
regional and national patterns of missing values as well. In Figure 1, we
present a heuristic model containing a system of explanations derived
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social background characteristics relevant to political euro-scepticism as
well as intermediates like socio-political attitudes. Moreover, we took
national and regional contextual characteristics into account. We suggest
that this overall model is more systematic in terms of different rival
theories at different levels for explaining political euro-scepticism and
is thus more appropriate for testing such rival hypotheses more rigorously
than previous research in order to find decisive determinants for political
euro-scepticism.
3. Data
Data were derived from the European Social Survey (ESS 2004a). An
extensive data description is available (ESS 2004b; Jowell et al . 2003).
Detailed information on country-specific stratification of samples can be
found in the country reports as provided by the ESS team in the ESS
Documentation Report 2002/2003 (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.
org). We included the 15 EU ‘old Member States’ as well as four of the
new ones: Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovenia. Data from
Switzerland and Norway were also included, even though these countries
are not members of the EU. Furthermore, we distinguished between East
and West Germany due to the large differences between these regions,
both currently and historically.
The regional level consists mostly of the geographical units defined by
Eurostat as NUTS2-level territories. However, for Belgium, France,
Germany and the United Kingdom, the higher level (NUTS1) territories
were used. For the Netherlands, we reduced the 40 NUTS3 units to 12
NUTS2 units. As for Denmark, Ireland and Slovenia, a geographical
breakdown hardly exists at the NUTS2 level, so here the NUTS3 level is
used. For the Czech Republic, information is available on the 14 Kraje /
the Czech NUTS3 level.
3.1. Dependent variable
The measure of political euro-scepticism has been taken into account in
the Eurobarometer surveys as well. People are asked to indicate at what
level they believe various policies should be mainly decided. A difference
from the Eurobarometer surveys is, however, that people are given the
possibility to answer ‘at an international level’ and ‘at a regional level’ as
well as the ‘European level’ and ‘national level’. For the present purpose,
we follow previous research based on the Eurobarometers, distinguishing
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only a national decision level versus a European decision level (De
Winter and Swyngedouw 1999; Hooghe 2003; Lubbers and Scheepers
2005).2
The policy items refer to ‘protection of the environment’, ‘fighting
crime’, ‘immigration’, ‘defence’, ‘social welfare’, ‘aid to developing
countries’, ‘agriculture’ and ‘interest rates’. In accordance with previous
results, the international level is preferred concerning ‘international’,
trans-border issues like protection of the environment and fighting crime
(Niedermayer 1995; Hooghe 2003). Social welfare is preferred by a large
majority at the national domain. Immigration policies are more un-
decided, which was also found for the Eurobarometer data (Lubbers and
Scheepers 2005). We created an index by summing the policy domains on
which people preferred to have intra-national decisions rather than
international decisions, resulting in a maximum score of eight. The more
people prefer policies to be decided at the national rather than the
international (EU/) level, the more they value national sovereignty over
the EU (or the international) level and, consequently, the higher the level
of political euro-scepticism. This measurement is normally distributed.
Having the highest score of eight and hence preferring the nation-state to
decide on all policy domains is reported by 5% of the European
population. At the other extreme (i.e., the score zero), 8% always prefers
the international level. Where people had one or two missing values on of
the eight items presented, we substituted them with the score of one if the
policy was preferred to be decided at the national level by a majority of
the respective nation’s population. This reduced the percentage of
missing values to 5.4%, but hardly altered the mean score in political
euro-scepticism in a country.
As can be seen in Table 1, there is a large variation across countries both
in the average score on political euro-scepticism and in the percentages of
missing values. In Ireland and the United Kingdom, the nation is most
often favoured as the level where policies should be decided. The nation is
least often favoured in Belgium, the Netherlands and West Germany.
Since in a previous study variation in missing values turned out to affect
regional and national variation in euro-scepticism (Lubbers and Scheepers
2005), we include aggregated measures of this at the national and regional
levels
2. Comparing the distributions of the policy items available in both ESS and
Eurobarometers, the similarities are remarkable when the international and
European levels are taken together, on the one hand, and the regional and national






































4. Measurements at the individual level
To measure educational attainment , we used information on the highest
educational level of the respondent in years. In order to assign a
numerical value for the respondents who were still studying at the time
of survey, we took their study length at the time of the interview. The
social class measurement follows the EGP classification (Erikson et al .
1983), but we additionally distinguished cultural specialists from
technical specialists as proposed by Gu¨veli et al . (2005). Monthly net
household income was measured using a standard number of categories
with standard ranges. To compare incomes between countries, the mean
income was set to one for each country separately. Urbanisation was
measured by means of five categories, as judged by the respondent. We
used information on religious attendance, which we categorised into
‘never’, ‘rarely’, ‘once a month’ and ‘once or more a week’. For age, we
included a quadratic term as well.
TABLE 1. Average, standard deviation and people not answering on political euro-scepticism by
country (N 36,121)
Mean Standard deviation Don’t know
FI Finland 4.51 1.85 1.5
SE Sweden 4.20 2.05 4.8
NO Norway 4.17 1.88 1.1
DK Denmark 3.82 2.11 5.9
GB Great Britain 4.57 2.03 2.2
IE Ireland 5.07 2.10 6.9
NL The Netherlands 2.46 1.82 2.1
BE Belgium 2.36 1.89 4.8
LU Luxemburg 2.92 1.91 6.2
WDE West Germany 2.59 1.76 1.0
EDE East Germany 2.85 1.87 1.7
AT Austria 3.34 1.98 4.6
CH Switzerland 3.23 1.90 2.0
FR France 2.88 2.22 1.2
ES Spain 3.20 2.49 15.9
PT Portugal 3.80 2.42 12.3
IT Italy 3.71 2.24 8.0
GR Greece 3.88 2.10 8.9
PO Poland 4.39 2.01 6.7
CZ Czech Republic 3.60 1.78 7.5
HU Hungary 4.39 2.11 9.5
SI Slovenia 3.55 2.43 7.5
Total Europe 3.65 2.18 5.4
Source: ESS (2002/2003).
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5. Measurement at the contextual level
We used numerous contextual measurements as referred to in the
hypotheses. We will outline these measurements briefly. Detailed
information can be derived from the authors upon request.
5.1. Nationalistic measurements
We found various measures to tap nationalistic or regionalist expressions
at the contextual level. First, we measured to what extent national cultural
expressions are dominant compared to foreign (mostly American)
influences, by percentages of domestic films and music consumption
(UNESCO 2000). As both measures correlate strongly (r0.53), we
summarised the two into one single measure of domestic popular culture.
European countries differ also with respect to the extent to which they use
their own language in television. We see television dubbing as an expression
of national culture (Hassanpour 2004; Koolstra et al . 2002; Luyken 1991).
Finally, we included a measurement on the number of public holidays that
were not religious-based in order to take into account national celebrations
(EU 2004).
With figures on non-EU nationals, we follow the publication of the
EUMC by Coenders et al . (2005; Eurostat 2003). Distance to Brussels is
calculated as the straight line between Brussels and the capital or main city
of a region as derived from the regional information site from the
European Commission (EC 2005). We follow Dı´ez Medrano (2003), taking
the natural logarithm of this measurement. All regions that have gained
some autonomy from the national state, or have some support for
separatist parties, are coded an ‘autonomous region ’.
5.2. Economic measurements
EU budgetary balance is taken for 2002 from the European Commission
report on allocation of EU expenditures (EC 2003) and is based on the so-
called ‘UK rebate definition’. At the regional level, we calculated the
yearly allocated funds per 100 capita in the period 2002/2006, which were
taken from European Structural Fund publications from the European
Commission (2004a). For the new Member States, the figures for 2004/
2006 are taken from European Commission (2004b). We calculated the
region’s agricultural funds by taking the number of agricultural workers as
a share of the total agricultural workers in a country and divided the






































Percentage of trade with other countries of the EU as a share of total trade
and the trade balance are taken from Eurostat (2005). Inflation of prices
has been derived from the IMF (2003) and reflects the 2002 situation. At
the regional level, we included a measurement of the number of foreign
tourists in hotels and campsites overnight in 2002 (Eurostat 2004), in
millions. The Spanish Balearic Islands were most often frequented
(42 million visitors), while the least tourists found their way into Polish
Opolskie.
5.3. Political measurements
Years of membership are calculated as related to the situation of 2002. With
regard to small countries, we followed the definition of less than 28 seats in
the European Parliament (EP 2004). Regions on borders were either coded
as situated at an ‘intra-EU border ’ or at an ‘outer-EU border ’. If both cases
applied, we chose to code it as an ‘outer-EU border ’. For calculating war
deaths, we followed Gabel and Palmer (1995), but with a difference: we
also included the deaths incurred in the Spanish Wars, the Greek Civilian
War and the Russian-Finnish War. For the Eastern European states as well
as former East Germany, we also included the victims of the communist
regimes. As a source of deaths during wars, we used Matthew White’s
website Twentieth Century Atlas (White 2005). This website combines
sources also used by Gabel and Palmer (1995), but adds other sources
as well. To calculate the war deaths per 1000 capita, we used the
documentation source of the Mannheim Centre for European Social
Research (Rothenbacher 2002), which provides data on the population of
the respective countries for 1939.
6. Measurements of intermediary characteristics
For the attitudes towards out-groups, we disentangled a measurement of
the attitude towards European immigrants and the attitude towards
immigrants in general. The former taps intra-EU migration and has
gained relevance during the enlargement of the EU. The latter is a
measurement without specification of the origin of the immigrants. Factor
analysis showed that these two measurements were empirically distinct.
The attitude toward European immigrants was measured by two items
asking to what extent people think immigrants from either poorer or
richer European countries should be allowed to enter the country. As the
two items correlated at 0.65, we took the items together as one
measurement of attitude toward European immigrants. To obtain a
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measurement that evaluates immigrants in general, we computed a scale of
perceived threat from immigrants, combining six items regarding the extent
to which people believe immigrants pose a threat to economy and culture.
The six items turned out to form a reliable scale (Cronbach’s alpha
0.84). People were also asked to what extent they believe it is important
to follow traditions and customs. This single item was used to measure
attachment to traditions. Political distrust was measured with four items,
which were transformed into items with similar scale lengths, running
from 0 to 10, where 10 means ‘no trust’. Reliability analyses provided
satisfactory statistics (Cronbach’s alpha0.76). We computed one scale of
political distrust by taking the mean of the scores on the four items.
Dissatisfaction with the government was measured straightforwardly on a
10-point scale. Similarly, people were asked to evaluate the state of the
country concerning the economy. Political interest was measured straightfor-
wardly, asking people to what extent they were interested in politics on a
4-point scale running from ‘not at all’ to ‘very interested’.
7. Results
To test our hypotheses, we used multilevel modeling (Snijders and Bosker
1999), nesting individuals in regions, and regions in countries / with the
computer program MlWin . We started out with a so-called ‘null-model’,
estimating only the extent of variation in political euro-scepticism between
individuals, regions and countries. Model 1 of Table 2 shows that variation
in political euro-scepticism exists at all three levels. The individual level
accounts for 86% of the variance, the country level for about 11.5%, and
the regional level about 2.5%. These figures are in line with previous
figures based on Eurobarometer data (Lubbers and Scheepers 2005).
In the second model, individual characteristics are included. Higher
educated people are less inclined to political euro-scepticism, corrobora-
ting the human capital hypothesis, consistent with previous research. With
respect to class, we find that manual workers and their supervisors are
much more politically euro-sceptic than the higher technical professionals,
also in support of the human capital hypothesis. However, the routine
non-manual workers and the self-employed do not differ significantly
from the higher technical professionals. Within the higher class positions,
we find a difference between higher socio-cultural professionals and
higher technical professionals, with the former being much less euro-
sceptical. No other social class category subscribes less to political euro-
scepticism. In contrast to previous findings on support from farmers for






































TABLE 2. Multilevel model of political euro-scepticism: Individual-level characteristics
(n 34,160)
Model 1 Model 2
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept 3.653 3.166
Individual characteristics





Higher technical professionals (reference)
Higher socio-cultural 0.309** 0.076
Lower technical professionals 0.054 0.046
Lower social-cultural professionals 0.021 0.053
Routine non-manual workers 0.083 0.051
Lower service workers 0.054 0.059
Lower sales workers 0.057 0.070
Self-employed with employees 0.026 0.075
Self-employed without employees 0.136* 0.071
Labour supervisors 0.182** 0.065
Skilled manual workers 0.166** 0.053
Unskilled manual workers 0.163** 0.048
Farmers/farm labourers 0.356** 0.065
Other (housekeeping/retired/student) 0.034 0.053
Income
Lowest quartile
Second-lowest quartile 0.083** 0.034
Second-highest quartile 0.113** 0.033
Highest quartile 0.186** 0.034
Church attendance
Once or more a week 0.138** 0.038
Once a month 0.004 0.040





Town or small city 0.057 0.036
Country village 0.102** 0.037
Countryside 0.221** 0.055
Variance components
Level 3: Country 0.539 0.169 0.506 (6.2%) .158
Level 2: Region 0.115 0.016 0.091 (17.3%) .013
Level 1: Individual 4.045 0.031 3.956 (3.1%) .030
Log-likelihood 145079 144292
Improvement 797
Notes: **pB0.01; *pB0.05; pB0.10. Explained proportion of variance between paren-
theses (Snijders & Bosker 1999: 102).
Source: ESS (2002/2003).
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farmers are more likely to be politically euro-sceptical as compared to the
higher technical professionals.
A lower level of political euro-scepticism is found among men and the
middle aged, which we derive from the negative coefficient of age and the
positive coefficient for the quadratic term of age. The capitalist hypothesis
is also corroborated with these data. The higher income groups are less
likely to favour political euro-scepticism than the lowest income groups.
We find that people in the countryside are more politically euro-sceptical
than city dwellers, just as regular church-goers are more politically euro-
sceptical compared to people who never attend church. Inclusion of
individual-level characteristics decreases the variance parameters of the
national and regional levels, implying the existence of composition effects.
As countries and regions differ in, for example, the level of educational
attainment, this explains why in some countries and regions the level of
political euro-scepticism is higher. The explained variance at the
individual level is quite low with 3.1% / as is often found in research
on euro-scepticism.
In Table 3 we include country and region characteristics. At the country
level, the degrees of freedom are restricted; therefore we included the
context characteristics block by block. We then tested model 3 in which
only those contextual characteristics are included that turned out to
be significant in one of the models. We find that in countries with more
migrants and where television dubbing is common practice, people
subscribe less to political euro-scepticism, which refutes our expectations.
The effect of domestic popular culture is non-significant. Although the
effect of numbers of non-religious national celebrations is in the expected
direction, the effect is not significant. At the regional level, a strong effect
is found regarding distance to Brussels: the further a region is from
Brussels, the more euro-sceptical are the people in that region.
Concerning economic country characteristics, we only corroborate the
hypothesis that in countries with higher percentages of trade with other
EU countries, people are less politically euro-sceptical. At the regional
level, the finding that the larger the agricultural returns, the more people
favour political euro-scepticism refuted the formulated hypothesis. The
effect from the number of tourists is as expected: in regions with more
foreign tourists, people are less politically sceptical. With respect to
political characteristics, we find that sustained membership is accompa-
nied by less political euro-scepticism. Although people in small countries
and in countries with more war deaths seem less sceptical towards
European decision making, none of these effects reaches significance. At
the regional level, we cannot corroborate the hypothesis that people in
bordering regions (either intra- or outer-EU) are less politically euro-














































Non-EU nationals 0.079** 0.034
Number of national holidays x
Domestic popular culture x
Television dubbing 0.494** 0.188
Economic context
Inflation x
EU budgetary balance x
Intra-EU trade 0.020 0.013
EU trade balance x
Political context
Years of membership 0.018** 0.008
Small country x
War deaths per 1000 capita x




Distance to Brussels 0.155** 0.062
Economic context
EU Structural Fund subsidies per 100 capita x
EU Agricultural subsidies per 100 capita 0.098** 0.029
Number of foreign tourists 0.010** 0.005
Political context
Border other EU country x
Border non-EU country x
Percentage missing values 0.013** 0.005
Variance components
Level 3: Country 0.159 (70.2%) 0.052
Level 2: Region 0.077 (28.6%) 0.012
Level 1: Individual 3.956 (10.8%) 0.030
Log-likelihood 144245
Improvement 47
Notes: **pB0.01; *pB0.05; pB0.10; explained proportion of variance between parenth-
eses. xnot included in the model.
Source: ES (2002/2003), added contextual characteristics.
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of political euro-scepticism. When a larger share of the respondents in a
region has a missing value on our dependent variable, the extent of
political euro-scepticism is lower than the country’s average. This finding
suggests that in regions where more people provide an answer, the
likelihood is larger that people are sceptical.
In model 4, presented in Table 4, we include the seven intermediate
characteristics we hypothesised upon, with three of them being highly
significant predictors of political euro-scepticism. People who object to
EU immigrants entering their country subscribe strongly to political euro-
scepticism. The more people perceive a threat from immigrants, the more
they adhere to political euro-scepticism. Third, we find that the stronger
people distrust politicians in general, the stronger they are politically euro-
sceptical. There is a small effect from political interest (at pB0.10 level),
the direction of which is consistent with previous research / namely, the
stronger the interest, the lower the levels of euro-scepticism. These socio-
political attitudes explain to a large extent why the lower educated and
manual workers are more supportive of political euro-scepticism and, to a
lesser extent, why this holds for lower income categories and men. We
derive this from comparing the parameters of these characteristics from
model 2 in Table 2 and model 4 in Table 4. Comparing effects of religion
and urbanisation, we find that the effects have not decreased due to the
inclusion of the socio-political characteristics, implying that there should
be other explanations.
8. Conclusions and discussion
European citizens face a European constitution proposing to transfer
many policy domains from the nation-state to Brussels, thereby reducing
national sovereignty. Although a majority of citizens subscribe to common
policies on topics of environment protection and the fight against drugs,
people show much scepticism in the socio-welfare policy domain. In this
contribution we focused on explanations for this political euro-scepticism
in 21 European countries. From a theoretical perspective, we argued that
the traditional explanations of instrumental euro-scepticism from eco-
nomic and political theory should be complemented with theories on
nationalism and anti-out-group attitudes. We formulated hypotheses to
explain variation in political euro-scepticism at the individual, regional
and national levels. With the ESS data / that we enriched with regional-
and national-level data / we were able to test our hypotheses as rigorously






































TABLE 4. Multilevel model of favouring the nation-state to decide on policies: Inclusion of intermediate characteristics (n 34,160)
Model 4 Model 4
b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept 3.380
Individual characteristics Country characteristics
Sex (men) 0.128** 0.024 Non-EU nationals 0.075** 0.033
Age 0.015** 0.003 Television dubbing 0.527** 0.200
Age-squared 2.1104** 0.34504 Intra-EU trade 0.018 0.015
Education 0.045** 0.011 Years of membership 0.018** 0.008
Social position Percentage missing values 0.014 0.026
Higher technical professionals (reference) Region characteristics
Higher socio-cultural 0.253** 0.076 Distance to Brussels 0.151** 0.063
Lower technical 0.030 0.045 Number of foreign tourists 0.008 0.005
Lower socio-cultural 0.067 0.053 EU Agricultural subsidies per 100 capita 0.096** 0.030
Routine non-manual workers 0.053 0.051 Percentage missing values 0.013** 0.005
Lower service workers 0.028 0.059
Lower sales workers 0.002 0.069 Intermediate characteristics
Self-employed with employees 0.005 0.074 Objection to EU immigrants 0.136** 0.018
Self-employed without employees 0.090 0.070 Threat from immigrants 0.105** 0.008
Labour supervisors 0.119 0.065 Attachment to traditions 0.006 0.009
Skilled manual workers 0.083 0.054 Political distrust 0.037** 0.007
Unskilled manual workers 0.085 0.048 Dissatisfaction with government 0.006 0.006
Farmers/farm labourers 0.289** 0.065 Political interest 0.026 0.014
Other (housekeeping/retired/student) 0.001 0.052 Dissatisfaction with economy of country 0.000 0.006
Income
Lowest quartile Variance components









































































































Model 4 Model 4
b s.e. b s.e.
Second-highest quartile 0.082** 0.033
Highest quartile 0.139** 0.034 Level 2: Region 0.078 (28.0%) 0.012
Church attendance
Once or more a week (reference) 0.169** 0.038 Level 1: Individual 3.900 (11.5%) 0.030
Once a month 0.041 0.040





Town or small city 0.026 0.036
Country village 0.054 0.037
Countryside 0.164** 0.055
Notes: ** pB0.01; * pB0.05; pB0.10; explained proportion of variance between parentheses.





















































































With regard to differences at the individual level / the level at which
most variance exists / we found support for the human capital and
capitalist hypotheses, as was previously found for instrumental euro-
scepticism. People with higher education and higher income are less
politically euro-sceptical. Moreover, manual workers turned out to be
more sceptical than higher technical specialists. The least sceptical,
though, turned out to be the socio-cultural specialists. It seems that this
category of ‘teachers, doctors and social scientists’ has little to fear from
further European integration and predominantly perceives opportunities.
Remarkably, we found that farmers were about the most sceptical
regarding transferring policies to Brussels, despite the large subsidies
this category receives from the EU.
We could not corroborate the hypothesis that it is, in particular, the
attachment to traditions that drives euro-sceptics. We found, rather, that
euro-scepticism prevails among people who fear European immigrants and
who perceive a threat from immigrants, which was also proposed by De
Master and Le Roy (2000). These attitudes are related particularly
strongly to political euro-scepticism, as we derived from social identity
theory. Since we know from previous research that national sentiments are
generally rather strongly related to out-group attitudes, we suggest that
attachment to traditions is not associated with political euro-scepticism
due to the inclusion of anti-out-group attitudes: we may conclude that it is
resistance to immigrants that fosters political euro-scepticism more
strongly than attachment to traditions.
Country and regional differences in political euro-scepticism were
explained by characteristics derived from all three theoretical perspectives,
though many determinants in previous research included were found to be
non-significant. Membership duration decreases political euro-scepticism.
Moreover, in countries that are more dependent on EU countries for their
trade, people are less politically euro-sceptic. Surprisingly, in countries
with larger proportions of non-Western emigrants, people are less euro-
sceptic, as is the case in countries where television dubbing is the common
practice, contrary to theoretical arguments that these circumstances would
trigger nationalist sentiments and increase political euro-scepticism.
Alternatively, we formulate that in countries with television dubbing,
people are more aware of their national identity and therefore fear losing it
to a lower degree.
At the regional level, people living further from Brussels were found to
be more politically euro-sceptic. Moreover, in regions where more foreign
tourists are received annually, people are less euro-sceptic. Finally, in
regions estimated to be receiving more agricultural subsidies, people were
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found to be more sceptical. This seems likely to be interpreted by localism
theory, as those are the European rural regions. It is, however, remarkable
that neither at the national nor the regional levels do financial burdens or
benefits play a role in explaining political euro-scepticism.
We have shown that political euro-scepticism is associated particularly
strongly to fears about European immigrants and losses of wealth and
traditions due to the inflow of new immigrants. The EU not only has to
explain to what extent Europe deals with money and bureaucracy (to meet
political distrust), and what Europe is about (to inform people who know
little about the EU), but above all to understand people’s fears of losing
national identity through the inflow of EU immigrants.
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